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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper intends to test the effects of improved property rights on the living situation for 
families in peripheral areas in Lima, Peru. The purpose of the study is to identify the 
mechanisms by which titling programs affect the quality of life for urban poor. The study 
focuses on access to credit, housing quality and allocation of labor. A survey was carried out 
in poor neighborhoods in Lima to be able to econometrically test the relation between the 
possession of a property title and a number of dependent variables related to the focus areas. 
Although the result in some cases varies depending on income levels and gender, it indicates 
that improved quality of housing and more efficient allocation of labor as mechanisms by 
which property rights can potentially improve the lives of the urban poor. However, little 
support can be found of improvement of the access to credit as an effect of the titling 
program. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic  development  theory  has,  during  the  last  30  years  stressed  the 
importance of sound property rights of housing and land as a prerequisite for 
economic growth and poverty alleviation (Platteau, 2000:55; Besley, 1995; Field; 
Torero, 2004:2). The Peruvian economist and entrepreneur Hernando de Soto has, 
since the beginning of the 80’s, advocated land-titling programs, giving legal titles to 
informal settlers, as an instrument for poverty reduction. He argues that ineffective 
property rights hinder the poor from transforming wealth, tide to illiquid resources, 
into capital (Galiani;Schargrodsky, 2006:1). These ideas have been adopted by 
international organizations and private institutions and have governed the global 
development discourse. Turning development theory into development practice, 
inspired by the spirit of de Soto, governments have launched housing- and land- 
titling programs in a large number of countries. 
The essence of de Soto’s ideas lies in the relationship between efficient property 
rights and productive investments, due to improved credit access for urban poor 
living in informal settlements (Galiani;Schargrodsky, 2006:1). Other investigators 
have identified other positive effects such as increased investments in housing, more 
effective labor allocation, increased property value, more effective transactions on 
property markets, efficiency of property use, and even positive impact on health 
(Durand-Lasserve, et al, 2007:2). 
Hernando de Soto, helped the Peruvian government, backed by the World Bank, 
to implement a housing-titling program in urban areas in Peru, mainly metropolitan 
Lima, in the mid-90s (Calderón, 2002:9). The program, which is the world’s largest 
urban titling program, has provided legal titles for more than 1.5 million households, 
benefitting around 7 million people, between 1996-2006 (Molina, 2011:3). The 
Peruvian program is considered the most extensive and successful program of its 
kind. The Peruvian program has also been the main inspiration in the implementation 
of similar programs around the world3. 
 
While  consensus  reigns  in  development  theory  about  the  positive  impact  of 
housing titling, the results of empirical studies are more heterogeneous. Many studies 
 
3 Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, South Africa, Turkey, Afghanistan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, 
Laos, Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Honduras, Paraguay (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky, 2006; Durand-Lasserve et al., 2007) 
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have not been able to identify the positive effects of titling as theory suggested 
(Durand-Lasserve, et al., 2007:4). As a result, the World Bank (2006) reports: “[the] 
consensus on this issue has since changed and become more nuanced. (…) The 
original assumptions have now become questions for empirical research.” (p. 12). 
Policymakers and scholars stay optimistic; they argue that not enough studies have 
been done. The Land Tenure Center reports that “The paucity of findings is due to 
both the lack of project documentation, (…), and to the quality of information 
provided in  the  reports  that  were  available.  The lack  of  post-project  impact 
evaluation studies made it impossible to determine long-term impacts” (cited in 
Durand-Lasserve, et al., 2007:4). Field stresses that even though there is a consensus 
about the importance of formalization of property for economic development, there 
is not enough evidence on the mechanisms by which improved property right 
improvements benefit economic growth (2005:1). 
This particular study aspires to provide more empirical evidence of the impact of 
the titling program in Lima. This to better understand the economic effects of 
improved property rights and also, more importantly, identify and study the 
mechanisms by which improved property rights stimulate economic performance. To 
do that, a hundred families living in the outskirts of Lima have been surveyed. 
Through an econometrical analysis using data containing both titled and untitled 
households, the objective is to critically analyze the impact of the property titles 
within the areas of access to credit, housing quality and labor allocation. 
 
 
1.1.1. Area of interest and research question 
 
The main  area  of interest  of this  study is  the  economic  effects  of  improved 
property rights for urban poor. The housing titling program in Lima, Peru, is used as 
a case to gather empirical data to analyze the validity of the assumptions expressed 
by economic theory about the housing titling programs. The Peruvian program is a 
good case since it is the largest and most well- known titling program in an urban 
setting, reaching more than 1.2 million households. The program was implemented 
around 1996, which makes it one of the first land title programs to be executed in an 
urban context. Several academics have carried out empirical studies of the effects of 
the program but few have been done recently. Today, 15 years later, it is more likely 
to identify long-run effects of the program. 
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With help from theory and previous studies I have identified three focal areas of 
the study. These areas are potential poverty-reduction mechanisms, by which 
improved property right are believed to affect the lives of urban poor: 
Access to credit 
 
Quality of housing 
 
Labor allocation and income 
 
I have chosen to focus on these three areas because of various reasons. They are 
tangible topics for the families. They affect them in a direct way and have a great 
impact on their lives. I, therefore, find them the most important. The fact that these 
issues are closer to the families facilitates data collection. Information about topics 
such as household income, education, labor, loans and housing issues is more 
accessible to the families.   When it comes to other areas, such as, property value, 
public cadasters systems, property tax and property transaction systems, it is more 
complicated to obtain reliable information. Additionally, the effects of an 
improvement in one of the latter variables most probably have less real impact on the 
everyday life of the family. 
 
 
2. Theory 
 
Secure property rights are seen as a precondition for economic growth. The lack of 
formal proof of property assets and the inability to guarantee security in the 
developing world has been identified as major obstacles for economic development. 
Traditional theory on  economic  growth  has  focused  on  capital  accumulation, 
access to labor, population growth, human capital and technology (Jones, 2002). The 
original growth models are built on simplifying assumptions about perfect property 
rights and complete absence of institutions (North, 1991:98; Besley, Ghatak, 
2009:3). The importance of effective property rights for economic development was 
stressed by scholars within the New Institutional approach to economic development 
(see North, 1991). Since then, institutional arrangements of securing property rights 
in the development world has been in the center of discussions within development 
economics, and, as a consequence, extensive housing-titling projects have been 
implemented world-wide. One of the most famous advocates of these housing-titling 
projects, acting with one foot in the academia and the other in politics is Hernando de 
Soto. He is an entrepreneur, economist and the author of The Other Path (1989) and 
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The Mystery of Capital (2000), among the most-cited non-western books published 
the last decades. 
In  The Other  Path  de  Soto  (1989) tries  to  explain  the failure of the  market 
economy in his home country Peru. He identified and calculated the costs of entering 
and remaining in the formal economy. Because of complicated and extensive legal 
systems and weak and corrupt governmental institutions these costs are substantial, 
creating constrains for poor people to enter and work within the official system. As 
an example de Soto describes the legal procedure for obtaining a piece of state- 
owned land in Lima. If a group of poor families would like to obtain a piece of land 
in the city, and legally build a house on it, it would take about 6 years and 11 months 
to receive the permits and imply enormous costs (p. 151). The costs of remaining in 
the system are also described as high. These costs constitutes taxes, fees, obligation 
to follow set of rules and the indirect costs reflected by the insecure legal system 
with ineffective courts and insecure property rights (p. 163). 
The informal economy, de Soto argues, also implies costs for those who live and 
work within it. Direct costs consist of bribes, expensive credit and undervalued 
informal property. The indirect costs are consequences of the informality; limited 
access to credit, inefficient labor allocation and impeded incentives to invest in 
housing. These loans could have been used to improve quality of life by investments 
in housing, education, consumption, or in productive ways, leading to enhanced 
productivity and increased demand for labor (de Soto, 1989:165-184). 
De Soto (2000) argues that poor people in the developing world are holders of a 
large amount of capital tied to illiquid resources like houses, land, businesses, crops, 
savings etc. In the undeveloped countries, the lack of a functioning system where 
property is organized and measured, the ownership of these assets is hard to prove 
and confirm legally (p. 45). This makes capital accumulation using existing assets an 
extremely complicated process. De Soto calls these assets where ownership is not 
formally defined, dead capital. With effective representation of property, the assets 
can live a life of its own, parallel to its material existence. A house can provide a roof 
over a family’s head, but can also be used as collateral to access credit, property is 
therefore, stresses de Soto, the key to create capital (p. 18), 78). 
In this study the focus will lie on three potential poverty-alleviating effects due to 
improved property rights, which will be tested empirically. In the following three 
parts  of  the  chapter,  these  mechanisms  will  be  described  to  provide  a  better 
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understanding  on  the  connection  between  improved  property  rights  and  poverty 
alleviation. 
 
 
2.1. Credit access 
 
The relationship between property rights and incentives to invest is a theme 
explored by many economists (Besley, 1995; Field, 2005; Field; Torero, 2004; 
Calderón, 2002; Galiani; Schargrodsky, 2006; Molina, 2011). Theory suggests that 
with formalization of legal property, the problems concerning asymmetry of 
information in the banks’ relation to poor borrowers can be alleviated, leading to 
lower  costs  for  lenders  and  improved  conditions  for  borrowers,  which  would 
improve the incentives to take loans in the formal bank sector (Calderón, 2002:18). 
This assumption is built on the idea that households, in possession of a legal proof of 
their  assets,  will  use  their  titles  to  pledge  collateral  to  obtain  credit.  This will 
facilitate the work of the banks, cutting administrative costs. As a result of the 
increased demand for credit, investments are assumed to rise. Investments can then 
be used in productive ventures, increasing labor productivity and revenue 
(Galiani;Schargrodsky, 2006:1). Ultimately, the poor will be able to improve their 
economic situation using the assets that they already possess, giving life to, using de 
Soto’s terminology, “dead capital”. 
Credit contracts are characterized by their interest rate and collateral requirements. 
Poor people sufferers from limited access to formal credit since they usually fail to 
offer collateral as a warranty for the lender and because the small sums that poor 
people demand makes supervision and administration of these small loans a costly 
enterprise (Field; Torero, 2004:6). The relation between collateralization and credit 
access is treated formally by Besley (1995) and Besley and Ghatak (2009). Besley 
(1995) suggests, referring to Feder et al. (1988), that if property is easier to 
collateralize, which is assumed to be a consequence of formalization of property 
rights, the lender will receive a lower interest rate by the bank. Effective property 
rights will eliminate the risk of collateral loss, limit the information cost involved 
with confirming ownership and lowering the foreclosure costs in case of default (pp. 
908-910). 
 
Besley  and  Ghatak  (2009)  illustrate  theoretically  how  credit  constraints  are 
relaxed through property rights. For an individual to be able to use its illiquid assets 
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as collateral there must be a legal structure making it possible for the bank to claim 
the asset in case of default. When the asset is large enough to alleviate the moral 
hazard problem entirely but is unable to do so because of insecure titling of that 
asset, the problem with ineffective property rights becomes particularly striking (pp. 
17-19).  In  sum,  the  model  suggests  that  improved  property  rights  facilitate  for 
lenders to claim collateralized property in case of default, this is reflected in the 
increased collateral value which in turn affects credit access and interest rates. The 
model suggests that to investigate the impact of a housing-titling program on credit 
access; value of property, collateral value and interest rates are useful variables to 
take into account. 
Field and Torero (2004) uses Bester’s model when analyzing credit access for 
participants in the housing-titling program in Lima. They analyze the credentials that 
the banks use when categorizing the applicants for credit. The authors argues that 
secure property rights will prevent or reduce credit rationing because titles enables 
banks to use contracts with different collateral requirements to separate low-risk 
from high-risk borrowers. Titles may also affect credit access indirectly, since it can 
increase the household wealth, because of more efficient labor allocation, so that 
even when the title is not used as collateral the household can meet a lower the 
interest rate since they now belong to a lower risk group (pp. 6-7). 
Field and Torero and Besley and Ghatak provide a valuable framework for 
analyzing property rights and formal credit. However, they are built on assumptions 
that  have  to  be  fulfilled  for  the  models  to  work.  First,  they  assume  that  the 
investment capacity in informal settlements is constrained by limited access to credit. 
Second, they assume that households are willing to use their houses as collateral to 
be able to finance investments. Besley and Ghatak’s model also assume that banks 
are willing to accept properties as collateral from households in low-income 
settlements (Durand-Lasserve; Selod, 2007:12). Considering the supply side, it is 
likely that urban poor have access to alternative forms of credit in the informal 
sector. These informal alternative might be preferred if the provider, for example, do 
not demand the use of collateral. It is also likely that urban poor find it risky to use 
their property as collateral for business investments. The third assumption is also 
precarious since it is likely that banks will refuse to lend money to low-income 
households even though they can pledge collateral, because of the risk of default and 
the administrative costs in relation to the risk and the size of loan are relatively high. 
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If one of these assumptions do not hold, then the housing-titling programs and the 
improved property rights will have limited or no effect on credit access. Mitchell 
(2007) is critical about the impact of housing-titling programs on access to credit. He 
questions the reliability in the assumptions that the theory on the connection between 
property rights and access to credit, are built upon. He means that the mechanisms 
that turn assets “outside” the market into financial prosperity within are difficult to 
identify in reality and in the theoretical literature (p. 254). He writes that those with 
informal property that seek title will not risk it by taking loans (p. 260). 
Improved access to credit could have a positive effect on the lives of the urban 
poor, if we assume that they live under a credit constraint. Credit can be used for 
investments in housing, productive investments, education, consumptions, hence 
improving the quality of life for the families. Access to credit could therefore be an 
important mechanism by which improved legal property rights can facilitate the life 
of the urban poor. 
 
 
2.2. Quality of Housing 
 
When families illegally invade a piece of land and construct a house, it is done in 
the cheapest and simplest way. They initially lack access to water, sanitation services 
and electricity. Inadequate materials are used and the family shares small spaces 
within the shelter. Theory suggests that insecure property rights impede families 
from investing in their property, since the lack of a property title makes long-term 
investments in housing risky. Hence, the improvement of tenure security as a 
consequence of improved property rights is suggested to have a positive effect on 
investment in housing (Durand-Lasserve, et al., 2007:1). This effect could be 
particularly strong in an urban context where land is more scares than in a rural 
setting (Patteau, 2000:57). Durand-Lasserve and Selod (2007) suggest that increased 
incentives to invest in housing caused by improved property rights can initiate four 
potential poverty-reduction mechanisms (p.11). First, they argue that since investing 
in housing is costly, the families will have to save or take loans to be able to finance 
renovations. The authors mean that if the families start to invest in housing as a 
consequence of improved property right, this might improve their ability to practice 
financial planning, which can play an important part in escaping poverty. Secondly, 
improvements of the environment of the house (less people per room, better building 
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material, electricity etc.) and better access to water and sanitation can have indirect 
positive effects on the health of the family members. Improvement of the house can 
also be beneficial for education, since it may provide a better study environment. 
Third, the authors suggest that the increased incentives to invest in housing can have 
beneficial externality effects. The families with property titles are more likely to 
invest in the community, because improvements in the surroundings of their property 
will be reflected in the price of the asset. This can be reflected in communal efforts to 
pave roads or install electricity, or, with a functioning municipal government, in the 
willingness of the household to pay local tax. The investments in housing might also 
have a positive indirect effect on the community increasing demand for labor, 
transport and building materials. Forth, the authors mention the effects on labor 
allocation and investments in home businesses. These effects will be discussed in the 
following part of the chapter (Durant-Lasserve; Selod, 2007:11-12). 
The effects mentioned above rest on the assumption that the lack of a property 
title causes tenure insecurity that constrain families to invest in housing. This 
assumption is not obvious. Tenure security may exist even without a property title. 
In this study we will assume that tenure security provides incentives to invest in 
housing. We believe that people are rational and it is not rational to invest in a 
property that you are likely to lose. It is rational, however, to improve the property 
you with certainty will live in and eventually will be able to sell, if you have the 
means and possibilities to do so. To find out if the property title distributed in Lima 
increases tenure security we will therefore look at household investments, taking 
income, the time spent in property and access to credit into account. In this way we 
will be able to find out if the property title has had a positive effect on tenure security 
and consequently initiating the poverty-reduction mechanisms presented above. We 
will thereby be able to find out if an increased incentive to invest in housing is one of 
the mechanism by which the property titling programs can potentially improve the 
lives of the urban poor. 
 
 
2.3. Labor allocation and income 
 
As discussed earlier, the insecurity of not having legal right to the property, and 
the lack of formal property protection, might force families to find ways to protect 
the house from invasion and/or expropriation. In untitled areas where there is a real 
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threat or expropriation, either the community or the families defend the properties at 
all times. This implies that some families always have to have someone present in the 
house, in fear of losing the house in their absence. Households members may 
therefore be limited to work inside the household or from working at all depending 
on the location of the property (Field, 2005:1). This is likely to primarily affect 
women, since they are the ones traditionally working from home or not working at 
all.  Theory  suggests  that  the  effect  of  insecure  tenure  security  also  provides 
incentives for child-labor outside the home since one parent (that may be single) 
must stay home at all times (Durant-Lasserve; Selod, 2007:11-12). Consequently, the 
negative effects of weak tenure security on allocation of labor are primarily affecting 
children and women. 
Improved property rights that increase tenure security and replaces informal 
property protection from community guard and individual homeowner protection 
with formal property protection through policing and the legal systems, will free time 
for families to spend on work or education. It can therefore lead to reduced child- 
labor, more participation in labor markets outside home, increased income since 
labor opportunities outside the home probably are more profitable (Field, 2005:1). It 
is also plausible that more participation outside the home and further away from the 
property (given the house is located far from the commercial center of the city) will 
increase work within the formal economy since the largest share of the informal 
economy is concentrated in the periphery of the city. This is positive for the entire 
economy since it increases the amount of taxpaying workers within the systems. 
As theory suggests improved tenure security can therefore have a positive on 
labor participation (especially for women who traditionally are the ones excluded 
from the labor market), reduced child-labor, increased participation in the formal 
labor market and increased incomes. Labor allocation can therefore be an important 
mechanism through which improved property rights can affect the lives of poor 
urban families. We will look at the connection between labor allocation, income, 
formal and informal labor participation and property titles to see if tendencies in the 
real world correspond to the notion of theory. 
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2.4. Previous Empirical Results 
 
Various investigators have tested these potential poverty-alleviating mechanisms 
empirically, discussed in the previous chapter. We are here going to discuss their 
findings. Several investigators have investigated the relation between access to credit 
and property titles and the result is somewhat heterogeneous. The Peruvian case is 
probably the most studied when it comes to access to credit. The earliest works, 
identified a credit boom from 2000-2003, but were unable to determine if the credit 
boom was due to the broad increased demand for credit as a consequence of titling or 
just an increase of supply (Cantuarias and Delgado, 2004:10). Later studies, in 
particular, the one by Field and Torero fails to find a correlation between titleholders 
and access to credit in the aftermath of the Peruvian titling program (2004:3). Galiani 
and Shargrodski found a modest relation between titling and access to credit in 
Argentina (2006:3). The same result can be found in studies of similar titling 
programs in Mexico (Angel, et. al., 2006:62), South Africa, Turkey and Colombia 
(Durand-Lasserve; et al., 2008:19). 
Both investments in housing and more efficient labor allocation are believed to be 
effects of improved tenure security. Several studies have been done on property titles 
and tenure security. The effects seem to depend, not only on the de-jure legal rights, 
but also on the perceived improvement on security by the titling program beneficiary. 
In some countries it is observed that if the risk of eviction is low before the 
implementation of the program the positive effects may not take place (Durand- 
Lasserve; et al., 2008:8). In Mexico, where evictions are not common, poor 
households choose not to participate in the titling program and there is a weak 
correlation between possession of a title and housing investments (Angel, 2006:61- 
62).  Consequently  there  are  no  observable  differences  in  housing  investments 
between titled and untitled households. The same situation has been observed in 
Egypt, Trinidad, Colombia, Morocco and West African cities (Durand-Lasserve; et 
al., 2008:14). The other way around, Sukumaran (1999:9) observes that, in India, a 
property title does not protect households from forced eviction. The property title, in 
that case, does not improve tenure security. Hence, if given a title, families will most 
likely not experience the positive effects on and of household investments. 
Concerning the case of Peru, some studies have identified pre-program perceived 
security (Durand-Lasserve; et al., 2008:8). However, COFOPRI the public agency 
Alvina Erman, 880412-7002 Supervisor: Pontus Hansson 
16 
 
 
 
 
that carried out the titling program in Peru did a survey among residents in Lima in 
 
2000 including both titleholders and untitled households. The result indicated that 
 
94% of the recently titled households felt that their tenure was secure, compared to 
only  47%  of  the  untitled  households  Angel  et.  al.  (2006:42).  Kagawa  (2001:9) 
carried out interviews in 1999, with recently titled households, who appeared to 
perceive   their   tenure   as   more   secure   after   titling,   this   result   complements 
COFOPRI’s result. 
The empirical evidence from studies of Field (2005) and Molina (2011) indicate 
that housing investments have increased as an effect of property titling in Lima. Field 
identified a rising trend of out-of-pocket financed housing investments among the 
recently titled households (pp. 280-281). Her analysis indicates that the demand for 
construction loans rises faster than demand, which she interpreted as a constraint on 
housing investments for poorer households. Molina developed Field’s arguments and 
tried to identify the long-run effects of the program, as well as differences in 
investments depending on income (2011:3). His econometric results indicate that the 
relation between possession of titles and housing investments is not significant for 
the poorest households, while more significant the higher the income, especially 
regarding long-run investments. Molina explain this by referring to the credit 
constraint for lower income households (p.12). 
The empirical results of the Peruvian case are indicating a positive impact on the 
housing investment effect from titling. Critics, however, state that the effects on 
housing  investments  depend  on  other  variables  than  housing  titling.  Security of 
tenure and income are believed to be the most important variable. As stated before 
they underline that security is not necessarily an effect from titling, it can surge from 
other situations such as the time spent in property and perceived low risk of eviction 
(Durand-Lasserve; et al., 2008:13-14). 
Concerning labor allocation, surprisingly little research have been done. The most 
cited work on labor allocation and housing titling is done by Field (2003) and is 
based on data gathered in several Peruvian cities. She identifies a positive correlation 
between working hours and titling, newly titled households work 17 % more hours 
on an average and are 47 % more likely to work outside the house (she did not look 
at gender differences). She also identifies a 27 % decrease in child labor due to 
titling. These numbers are significant and surprisingly high, considering that the 
titled households in the study received their titles only a few years previous to the 
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survey (p. 8). Revising the methodology of her study, a number of problematic issues 
can  be  highlighted.  The  main  problem,  also  highlighted  by  Mitchell  (2006  in 
Durand-Lasserve; et al., 2008:22) and Galiani and Shargrodsky (2005:28), is the 
geographical distribution of the sample that she uses. Almost half of the titled 
households are from Lima, while only around 10 % of the untitled households are 
from Lima. More than half of the untitled households are from only two mid-size 
provincial cities. This cause a significant bias since the economic opportunities in the 
capital is significantly better than in the provincial cities. Child labor in rural 
agricultural societies is also more common that child labor in an urban household 
context. Hence, a lot of the effects on child labor and labor mobility identified by 
Field, is probably more due to transprovincial differences than an effect of titling. 
Galiani and Shargrodsky (2005) did not identify any correlation between title 
possession and income, female labor participation or child labor in their study from 
Argentina (p. 28). Moura et al. (2011) focused on labor supply and found a positive 
impact of the property title on the amount of hours worked in Brazil but did not 
include female labor participation or child labor. The heterogeneous results of the 
empirical studies underline the need of more studies about the impact of titling 
programs, especially in an urban context. This study aspires to complement earlier 
surveys; confirming the result of some studies; questioning the result of others. 
 
 
 
3. Method and Data 
 
The   empirical   analysis   of   the   relation   between   housing   formalization   and 
development for urban poor, focusing on three potential poverty-reducing 
mechanisms, relies on a survey carried out exclusively for this study. A number of 
econometrical models have been constructed and tested, analyzing the impact of 
improved property rights on the variation of relevant dependent variables related to 
the areas of interest; access to credit; quality of housing and allocation of labor. 
These models are estimated with the Least Square method with a probability level of 
5 %. Besides the possession of a title I use a number of control variables such as 
years spent in house, age, gender, income and education. 
100 underprivileged families living in the outskirts of Lima have participated in 
the survey. They were chosen arbitrary when walking up and down the streets of 
Villa El Salvador and Tacalá, Chorrillos. These municipalities were chosen because 
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they were part of the first group of districts in Lima to be titled when COFOPRI 
started issuing titled during the mid-90s. These areas are located in the south cone of 
the Metropolitan Lima; considered among the most economically marginalized areas 
in Lima (APEIM, 2005:8). I separated the questionnaire in 5 different areas: the 
family; the house; access to credit; income and education. I chose to use scales 
instead of real numbers for a number of variables; income, education, size of loans, 
which facilitated for families answering the questions. I also chose to focus on the 
families instead of the individual. This implied that the person surveyed had to 
answer for the whole family. Since the title is given to a household and not to 
individuals, this method seemed reasonable. Household investments, for example, 
are carried out collectively. I also hoped that this strategy indirectly could amplify 
my sample with information about labor allocation, income and education of all 
family members. I was initially worried that people would not be able to answer 
questions about their family, but the strategy was successful and felt natural in the 
context of suburban Lima, where families are very close. Consequently the number 
of included individual went from a 100 questioned to a total of 574 family members 
indirectly included in the study, out of which 244 are working. 
In Lima, millions of titles have been distributed and I was initially worried that it 
would be challenging to identify un-titled settlements, which were not located in 
extremely poor and peripheral areas. Conscious of the previous investigator’s 
problems of measuring the effects of the title programs, I worked hard to identify 
areas where titled and untitled (or recently titled) households are situated side-by- 
side  and  therefore  have  access  to  the  same  education  and  labor  opportunities, 
avoiding sample bias. With help from connections within the civil society, friends 
and connections at the municipality of Villa El Salvador, where most of the surveyed 
families lived, I identified 5 major areas where the study took place. The area Chavín 
de Huantar was particularly important since the households there got their titles just 
months before my arrival. These families have lived 13 years without titles and the 
residents of this area provided valuable information about access to credit, labor 
allocation and housing quality for un-titled households, serving as the studies main 
control group. Sector 9 and Sector 7 are located very close to Chavín de Huantar and 
are some of the first areas to be titled by COFOPRI in the Peruvian titling program 
around 1996-1998. In the same areas, there were many families that lagged behind 
and received their titles around 2001. To be able to see the development of the title 
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owners I also included households from an economically and geographically 
equivalent area in Chorrillos, called Tacalá, where the families received their titles 
around 2005-2006. In all neighborhoods there were households that for different 
reasons did not possessed a title, they are also part of the control group. 
As with all surveys, mine has a number of problems. The sample is very small; 
too small to be able to uncritically draw any general conclusions about the situation 
for poor families in Lima, or even in Villa El Salvador or Tacalá. The survey was 
realized during the day, which may have affected the availability of people who are 
not home during the day. It was harder to find men to answer questions than women; 
consequently, 70 % of the participants are women, which might create a tendency in 
the sample. However, these kinds of tendencies are hard to avoid and the most 
important aspect of it is that untitled and titled households are surveyed in the same 
way, since title possession is the most interesting variable for the study. With this I 
mean that the timing of the survey would cause more severe problems if I, for 
example, had been walking around in the titled neighborhoods during the evenings 
and in the untitled neighborhoods during the day. The gender issue is party solved by 
focusing on families instead of individuals, as I mentioned earlier. This way, only 54 
% of the participating parents or “heads of household” are women, decreasing the 
bias that might have appeared having 70 % female participants in the sample. 
It might be suspected  that title possession is not random.  In the case of the 
Peruvian title program, neighborhoods were titled at the same time and the process 
was free of charge for the families. These circumstances minimize the risk of 
tendencies. Still, it is possible to observe that the heads of household in the untitled 
properties are younger, 42.2 years on an average, while 47.5 years in the titled 
households. The difference is not staggering but important to highlight. The untitled 
households also have 15% less total income on an average than the titled households, 
which can be due to other reasons than the possession of a titles or the age difference. 
These  differences  are  important  to  keep  in  mind  when  analyzing  the  results. 
However, they are very difficult to avoid when using as small sample as mine. 
Many of the families included in the survey, belong to the bottom layer of the 
economic scale in Lima. The families are large, the rooms are few, water and 
sanitation services are in some cases absent, the houses are built with temporary and 
deficient  materials  and  income  is  below  average  (Prialé  Reyes,  et  al.,  2011:6). 
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However, surprisingly, the families are using credit actively4. More detailed 
information about the surveyed families is found in Appendix 1. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
With the help from this sample we will now look at the three areas of interest earlier 
discussed; Access to credit, quality of housing and allocation of labor. Each part 
includes  a  brief  methodological  discussion  and  the  identification  of  relevant 
variables. Finally we are going to analyze the variation in the variables to see how 
they react to the access of property titles. 
 
 
4.1. Access to credit 
 
In this chapter the connection between property rights and access to credit will be 
assessed. Is improved access to credit one of the mechanisms by which improved 
property rights, make life easier for poor families? We will consider the dummy 
variable for title possession in the following model: 
 
 
Access to credit5 = β1 + β2*title-dummy + β3*income family + β4*age mean 
parents + β5*invasion-dummy + β7*formal-dummy_Household + β8*Independent- 
dummy_Household 
 
 
4.1.1. Control variables 
 
Household income is a natural variable to include since critics of the relation 
between titling and access to credit often are based on the theory that income matters 
more than title possession. Average age of the parents in the households is included. 
The invasion-dummy (invasion=1) is a variable that I included to see if the 
households’ relation to informality in the past could affect its relation to formal 
credit. Formal employment of any working individual in household (formal=1) is 
included to see if formal participation of any of the family members on the labor 
market facilitate access to formal credit. An assumption made by various studies. 
The last control variable relates to entrepreneurship and access to credit. It is a 
 
 
4 I found it surprising since most empirical studies indicate that lower income families in Lima suffer from a 
credit constraint. 
5 See appendix 1 for more information on how I have measured access to credit 
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dummy variable stating if any of the family members has a small-scale business 
 
(independent=1). There is no significant covariance between the variables. 
 
Households that have not considered obtaining credit are excluded from the 
sample. There are only 82 observations included in the regression. 
For the measurement of access to credit, I found no significant relation between 
any of the variables and access to formal credit. The p-value of the F-statistic is not 
significant either.  It is  therefore not possible to reject the null-hypothesis of no 
relation between the dependent and independent variables. 
If we look at access to all credit, which also includes informal forms of credit, the 
p-value for the title-dummy is under 5%. The result indicates a significant relation 
between access to all credit and possession of property title. However, the p-value of 
the F-statistic is still above 5 %, which implies that we cannot reject the null- 
hypothesis  of  no  relation  between  the  dependent  and  any  of  the  independent 
variables. In addition, if we exclude a couple of not significant variables from the 
regression the p-value of the title-dummy loses its significance, since the p-value 
rises above 5 %. Additionally, the result does not make sense in reality. The fact that 
the importance of a possession of a title was more significant when the informal 
credit was included in the dependent variable does not make sense, since it is 
improbable to assume that title possession would increase access to informal credit. 
This result is probably due to the fact that, in my sample, a few more informal loans 
have been accredited to titled households than untitled households, which might as 
well be a mere coincidence. 
It is more plausible that the problem with the model is the measurement of access 
to credit that I have used. Let us convert the measurement of access to credit to a 
dummy variable for obtained credit instead. We have two groups, separated with a 
dummy variable for loans (households that have obtained formal credit = 1, the 
households that have considered lending money but have not obtained credit = 0). 
This is a more straight-forward approach. The problem is that it does not account for 
the differences in the reasons why the families have not obtained credit (for example 
the ones that have been denied and the ones that simply just have chosen not to 
apply) and it does not account for the differences between the families that have 
obtained credit (the ones that have obtained a low amount of credit from a micro- 
loan institute and the ones that have obtained several large loans from different 
commercial banks). We consider the following model: 
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Loan-dummy = β1 + β2*title-dummy + β3*income family + β4*age mean parents + 
β5*invasion-dummy + β7*formal-dummy_Household + β8*Independent- 
dummy_Household 
 
 
Using the same control variables as before and the same amount of observations 
we obtain a similar result. The title-dummy is barely significant. The result indicates 
that the possession of a property title has a positive effect on the access to credit. The 
p-value of the F-statistic, however, is very high and therefore not significant. 
 
 
Table 1 Access to credit 
 
 
title-dummy 
income 
age 
invasion-dummy 
formal-dummy 
Independent-dummy 
Adjusted R2 
P-value (F-statistic) 
Observations 
Formal credit All credit Loan-dummy 
1.0892 1.4223** 0.2082* 
0.3804 0.1338 0.001 
-0.0181 -0.0578* -0.0117** 
-0.1310 0.4209 -0.0370 
0.2680 0.8339 0.1296 
0.8298 0.2140 0.0673 
0.0195 0.0617 0.0286 
0.2823 0.0919 0.2246 
82 82 83 
P-values: *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01 
 
 
 
The econometric analysis of the data collected did not give statistically strong results 
to be able to draw any general conclusions. It seems as if the possession of a property 
title has a somewhat significant impact on the access to credit. This result is in line 
with the theories on the importance of property titles and the rhetoric of Hernando de 
Soto, but deviates from the results from previous empirical investigations. Let us 
look closer at the data on the loans. Hernando de Soto claimed not only that the 
distribution of legal property rights would facilitate the access to credit through 
collateralization of the property, but also that the credit would be used for productive 
investments, providing tools for the urban poor to “help themselves”. 
 
 
4.1.2. Loans 
 
It is a total of 94 loans in the data, among which, 5 are repeated loans. Repeated 
loans are loans that the household takes out every year or every second year during a 
time period. I treat these loans as individual loans for facility reasons and because 
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they usually are the same when it come to how they were obtained, the costs and the 
purpose. 14 of the loans are informal loans. 53 out of the 94 loans are obtained from 
households with a property title, which is about 56 % of total, which corresponds to 
the amount of title holders in relation to non-title holders in the sample (also 56 %). 
When including all loans, it seems as if the untitled households are as active on the 
credit market as the titleholders. Let us look closer at how these households obtained 
the loans. 
 
 
4.1.3. Obtaining credit 
 
Looking at the data on how the loan takers have obtained credit it appears obvious 
that the titles facilitate the accessibility of credit. Around 25.5 % of the loans have 
been obtained by using a property title as collateral or just as proof of liquidity for 
the bank. In three cases where the loans were obtained this way, the loan takers were 
not title owners and have used a relative’s title to obtain credit. This result indicates 
that the titles are actually used to obtain credit for some households. Around 28.7 % 
of the loans are obtained by personal connection with the lender, either a person from 
the bank or institute or, in the case of informal credit, a relative or a work place. 
From interviewing one of the most active credit users in my sample, she confirmed 
the importance of personal connection for obtaining credit (Oré, 2012). To get your 
first loan, documentation of your ability to repay the loan is needed. The title can be 
one of many ways to obtain your first loan and after having paid off the loan you 
have a personal relationship with the bank, which makes it easier to obtain the 
second loan, and so on. 
 
 
4.1.4.  Usage of credit 
 
Among  the  loans  in  this  survey  almost  49  %  were  used  for  productive 
investments. The most common investments were to buy a moto-taxi, commodities 
to sell, to build a store in connection to the house or to buy a mobile cooking wagon 
to cook and sell food in the street. The second most common usage of the loans were 
housing investments, 27.7 % of the loans were used for this purpose. Usually they 
upgraded walls or put floors on the ground. Another common investment was also 
the communal investments in water and electricity they made in the neighborhood 
when they got their titles. The third most common purpose of the use of credit was 
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for  consumption;  around  15  %  of  the  loans  in  the  sample  were  used  for 
consumptions. The forth purpose for obtaining credit was to pay for education. If we 
separate the sample into titled and untitled households we can look for differences in 
the usage of the credit. This comparison turns out to be theoretically interesting. 
The untitled household use 56 % of their loans on productive investments in 
relation to 43.3 % of the titled households. This contradicts Hernando de Soto’s 
claim that the titles would make poor people help themselves out of poverty with the 
help of credit and productive investments. The result indicates that title possession 
does not make people use their credit to start businesses. 
The households in possession of a title have a tendency to invest more in housing 
than the untitled households, 40 % of the titled households’ loans are invested in 
housing improvements, while only 12 % of the untitled households’ loans are spent 
on housing. The result is logical and concords with previous theoretical discussions 
about the effects of improved tenure security. The household in possession of a title 
can make long-term investments in the house because they know they will be able to 
stay in the house and get the invested effort back, in case they choose to sell. Further 
discussions about security of tenure and housing investments will follow in the next 
part of this chapter. 
Untitled households use 19.5% of the loans on consumption in relation to 11.3% 
of  the  titled  households.  It  could  be  argued  that  the  difference  depends  on  the 
inability to invest in housing for the untitled households. If you can access credit, and 
want to improve quality of life for your family but lack security of tenure, you might 
prefer to invest in other goods such as furniture, kitchen equipment, a television or a 
washing machine. The difference may also be due to other underlying differences 
between the households; average age of heads of households, relative poverty and/or 
general life situation6. 
 
The titled households invest more of their loans in education, 13.2 % of titled 
households’ loans in relation to 7.3 % of the untitled households. This could also be 
an effect of improved tenure security since parents might be keener on their children 
obtaining an education since they no longer need them to stay close to the property in 
 
 
6 The untitled households in my sample have on an average a little bit younger heads of households. It might be 
plausible to believe that younger parents are keener on using credit cards when consuming, while older parents 
are more conservative when it comes to consuming on credit. Untitled households might also be keener on using 
credit for consumption, trying to improve quality of life by buying equipment, adequate clothing and/or vehicles 
rather than investing in housing. 
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fear or expropriation. That, though, might be a bold statement based on relatively 
insignificant evidence considering the limited size of the sample. 
The data on utilization of credit in relation to possession of property title has been 
compiled in the table below. 
 
 
Table 2 Usage of obtained credit separated by possession of property title 
 
Titled 
 
Untitled 
 
All 
 
 households households households 
Productive investments 43.4% 56.1% 48.9% 
Investments in housing 39.6% 12.2% 27.7% 
Consumption 11.3% 19.5% 10.6% 
Education 13.2% 7.3 % 14.9% 
Other 3.8% 12.2% 7.4% 
Observations 53 41 94 
 
 
 
4.1.5.   Costs of credit 
 
It was generally hard to obtain information about the costs of obtaining credit. 
Most loans are paid with monthly or weekly quotas. With help from the data the 
families could provide, I calculated the interest rate and categorized the costs on a 
scale from 1-6 since, treating the provided information as approximations. Of the 80 
formal loans, I had data on the costs of 48 loans, 22 from titled households and 26 
from untitled households. Out of those loans, the average cost of the untitled 
households’ loans was about 10 % less than the costs of the titled households’ loans. 
This is a rather small difference since I used approximations that can be expected to 
differ from the real price. Even though it may be difficult to draw any general 
conclusion based upon the result, it is possible to observe that no mayor difference 
can  be  reported  in  the  costs  of  credit  for  titled  and  untitled  household  in  this 
particular sample. 
If we compare my findings with the similar study done by Kagawa (2001), the 
major difference is the amount of loans in this sample. He carried out interviews in 
peripheral areas in Lima including 629 households belonging to basically the same 
income range as my sample. One major difference, however, is the amount of loans. 
In 1999, when the survey was carried out, only 16 loans had been issued for 629 
families (Kagawa, 2001:8). In my sample containing only a 100 families, 94 loans 
have been observed. As mentioned earlier, studies indicated that the use of credit 
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increased in Peru in the beginning of the 2000 (Cantuarias and Delgado, 2006:10). 
Solely considering this particular sample it appears as if the credit market has kept on 
expanding, making credit accessible for more people. This assumption is supported 
by the fact that more than half of the loans in this particular sample are obtained 
during the last two years. This indicates that there is a credit boom in Peru. Based on 
the data of this sample the titleholders and the untitled households appear to be 
affected in the same way from the increased credit supply. This can be due to relaxed 
regulations to obtained credit and/or dysfunctional credit markets. 
 
 
4.2. Quality of housing 
 
While looking at the loans it is possible to conclude that titled households seem 
more inclined to use credit to invest in housing. In this part of the chapter we are also 
going to include the households that did not use credit during the time they lived in 
the property, and analyze a number of dependent variables to see if the possession of 
a title affects the quality of housing. We use four dependent variables: material of 
housing (wood=1, bricks=2, noble material7=3), access to water (yes=1), access to 
 
electricity (yes=1) and people per room. As previously, we are considering the effect 
of the dummy variable for title (yes =1). 
The dependent variables we are going to analyze are the following: 
 
 
 
Material = β1 + β2*title-dummy + β3*time spent in house + β4*income family + 
 
β5*loan_dummy 
 
 
 
Water = β1  + β2*title-dummy + β3*time spent in house + β4*income family + 
 
β5*loan_dummy 
 
 
 
Electricity = β1 + β2*title-dummy + β3*time spent in house + β4*income family + 
 
β5*loan_dummy 
 
 
 
People per room = β1 + β2*title-dummy + β3*time spent in house + β4*income 
family + β5*loan_dummy 
 
 
 
7 Noble material, Material noble, is a term used to describe a ”finished” wall. It is made up by bricks and 
cement. 
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4.2.1. Control variables 
 
Time spent in house, measured in years. It is probable that the incentives to invest 
in  housing  increase  with  time  spent  in  property.  As  discussed  earlier  it  is  also 
probable that families feel more secure about being able to stay in the house with 
time, even though they do not possess a property title. This effect of time spent in 
house is an effect of perceived tenure security, with other words, the same effect as 
the possession of a title, but for another reason. 
Total income of family is also used as a control variable since the capacity to 
investment in housing is probably related to income. I have also included the loan- 
dummy as a measurement of access to credit. The problem with this variable is that it 
really does not measure access to credit, but rather differentiate families that have 
taken  a  loan  from  those  who  have  not.  To  be  able  to  use  the  variable  as  a 
measurement of access to credit to see if this affects quality of housing we will 
indirectly assume that the families that have not used credit are constrained from 
obtaining  credit.  There  is  no  significant  covariance  between  the  independent 
variables, besides between “time spent in house” and the possession of title (50% 
correlation), since our main interest is the result of the title-dummy, this correlation 
might cause problems (Verbeek, 2012:44). In the table below we have the result from 
the four regressions; 
Table 3 Quality of housing 
 
 Material Water Electricity 
Title dummy 0.5700*** 0.2953*** 0.8641*** 
Time spent in house 0.0248 0.0130 -0.0227*** 
Income family -0.0286 -0.0021 0.0050 
Loan dummy 0.2068 0.0189 -0.0394 
R2 0.185 0.167 0.637 
P-value (F-statistic) 0.000646 0.001638 0.000000 
Observations 99 99 99 
 
 
 
People per room 
 
Title dummy 0.0155 
 
Time spent in house -0.0040 
 
Income family 0.1161** 
 
Loan dummy -0.1365 
 
R2 0.044155 
 
P-value of F-statistic 0.368209 
 
Observations 99 
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P-values: *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01 
 
 
 
Out  of  the  four  regressions  three  were  significant  for  at  least  one  of  the 
independent variables (see p-values for F-statistics). Let us start out by looking at 
those. 
The possession of a property title has a strong effect on the quality of housing. In 
the case of access to water and electricity, the title-dummy variable has a statistically 
strong positive effect. This indicates that households are keener on investing in the 
access to electricity, water and sanitation services when they have received their 
titles. These are investments that will improve the quality of life of the families. As 
discussed earlier the positive effects from accessing water and electricity are various. 
There are plausible positive effects on health by facilitating cleaning and cooking 
conditions, and education, since the house provides a better study environment for 
the children and making it possible to access computers and internet. Comparing data 
in the sample the difference is significant; the access to internet in the house for the 
untitled households is only 8.7%, while the access to internet for the titled household 
is 35.2 %. 
In the case of the variable for electricity, the time spent in the house is also 
significant, but the coefficient is negative. This does not concord with our theory that 
time  spent  in  property  will  increase  the  notion  of  security.  It  can  however  be 
suspected that the negative coefficient of time spent in house, is caused by the 
correlation the variable has with the title-dummy. This is probable, because when the 
title-dummy is excluded from the regression, the time variable becomes positive, but 
is no longer significant. Looking at the coefficient we also see that the effect is rather 
weak in comparison to the title-dummy. 
The result is consistent with theory and the title evidently has a strong effect on 
the access to water and electricity. The reason, stated by theory, is improved tenure 
security  which  creates  incentives  to  invest  in  housing,  accessing  water  and 
electricity. However, accessing water and electricity services is not something that 
individual families can do on their own. It takes a communal effort to make the 
investments necessary to install water lines and electricity reds. The municipality and 
the neighborhood community are the main actors in realizing these projects. By 
talking to residents and political leaders in the area it became clear that the title is 
more of a precondition to gain access to municipal services and improved tenure 
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security  is  probably  not  the  main  reason  why  the  titled  households  invest  in 
electricity and water (Soto Mendoza, 2012). Before they receive the title the majority 
of them simply cannot access water and electricity, except for a few exceptions. The 
fight for legal rights for housing goes many times hand-in-hand with the fight for 
access to municipal services and when a community obtains titles they collect money 
collectively to pay the costs connected to water and electricity installations. In the 
light  of  that  conclusion,  the  significant  relation  between  access  to  water  and 
electricity and possession of property titles is probably not caused by improved 
tenure  security,  but  rather  the  titles’  function  as  a  pre-condition  for  access  to 
discussed services. 
Let us instead consider the variable for the material of the house and the people 
per room. It is plausible to suspect that families, when they receive the legal right to 
their house, choose to invest in an extension of the house making more room for 
family members. This theory, however, do not seem to be correct, considering my 
sample. Since the p-value of the F-statistic in the people per room regression is over 
5 % it is not possible to reject the null-hypothesis that none of the independent 
variables has a significant effect on the variation of the dependent variable. The only 
significant variable is income (p-value = 0.0498) and its effect is positive, which 
implies that the more the families on an average earn the more people per room they 
tend to have. This result is opposite to what we initially believed. In the context of 
suburban Lima, however, it is not that surprising. The more people living in the 
house, the more people work and therefore, the total income of the household is 
larger. Grandchildren, grandparents, cousins, nephews and siblings-in-law commonly 
share the same roof. One family per room is a normal constellation. If the family 
would construct another room, another extended family would probably move in to 
that room, increasing the total number of people per room. The amount of people per 
room is, in this case, not an adequate estimate for quality of housing. 
The first thing that families seem to want to do when they choose to invest in their 
house, in the context of suburban Lima, is to upgrade the walls and ceiling of the 
house. The material of the walls is therefore a better measurement of the quality of 
housing. It is also an investment that the families realize on their own, without 
pressure from the community. It is an investment that they are not, in any way other 
then  the  lack  of  tenure  security,  is  limited  from  doing  before  receiving  a  title. 
Looking at the result of the regression we can conclude that the title has a positive 
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effect on investment in upgrading the house. Titled households tend to invest more in 
housing than untitled households. This result is in line with the theory of the effects 
of tenure security on housing investments. When updating the house, the property is 
better equipped to resist weather changes, natural disasters and burglaries. The result 
implies automatically that untitled households are limited by the fact that they do not 
have legal rights to their property. This affect might be stronger in an urban context 
because of the larger scarcity of land, as suggested by Patteau (2000). A comparative 
study of titling programs in rural and urban areas is needed to confirm that theory. 
The improvement of tenure security appears in sum to have a significant effect on 
housing investments. The result is in line with previous studies of the Peruvian titling 
program and with theory. 
 
 
4.2.2. Effects on housing investments depending on income level 
 
Molina  (2011)  showed  that  the  effect  on  housing  investments  only  appeared 
among the more economically privileged households. To control for income 
differences, I separated the sample in two groups: the unprivileged households with 
an income 1-2 (42 families), and the less unprivileged group 3-6 (57 families). An 
obvious problem with this separation is that the number of members in household is 
not considered. 
 
 
Table 4 Effects on investments in housing depending on income level 
 
 
 
 
Type of Household 
 
Title dummy 
Time spent in house 
 
Income family 
Loan dummy 
R2 
P-value (F-statistic) 
Observations 
Material 
Unprivileged Less unprivileged 
 
0.4204 0.6412** 
0.0255 0.0283 
 
0.0185 -0.0282 
 
0.0604 0.2985 
 
0.1422 0.2220 
 
0.2125 0.0099 
 
42 57 
P-values: *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01 
 
 
 
The results indicate that the effects of possession of title on housing investments 
are different depending on income. For poorer households the title variable is not 
significant, which indicate that it does not have the expected effect as for the more 
privileged households. It is possible that housing titling as a development policy is 
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not effective for the poorest households since it relies of the effort of the households 
to improve their own situation by potential indirect effects such as improved access 
to credit and increased incentives to invest. This highlights the importance, stressed 
by many critics of the housing titling programs, of complementary policies and 
efforts, besides the formalization of property. 
The previous result still holds, however, and investment in housing, seems to be 
one of the mechanisms by which improved property rights can improve the quality of 
life for urban poor. The discussion in the theory part highlighted the positive indirect 
effects that increased investments in housing can have on the family, the community 
and the local economy. If theory holds, the results imply that the titling program in 
Lima may have had those positive effects as a consequence of the increasing 
incentives  to  invest  in  housing.  The  indirect  consequences,  on  health,  local 
community  investments,  revenue  from  property  tax  and  boosts  for  the  local 
economy, however, are not covered by this study. 
As previous studies have stated, the titles may not lead to increased investment 
rates in housing if it existed tenure security previous to the titling. Since I have 
observed an increase in housing investments, this may indirectly imply that the titles 
in fact brought a notion of increased security of tenure for the residents, which is an 
important result in itself. The latter observation compliments the results of the survey 
done by COFOPRI in 2000 (Angel, 2006) and the qualitative interviews done by 
Kagawi (2001) in 1999 about perceived tenure security after titling, with 
contemporary data. This implies that the titles still provides a perceived notion of 
security for the households, 15 years after the implementation of the program. 
 
 
4.3 Allocation of labor 
 
Theory suggests that possession of a property title can affect labor allocation by 
improved tenure security. As previous, we are analyzing how the dummy variable for 
title possession (if yes = 1), affect the variation of a number of dependent variables; 
workplace allocation (outside home = 1, inside home = 0), labor market allocation 
(Formal = 1, Informal = 0), income allocation (Self-providing = 1, Employed = 0) 
and income (units). Hence, to analyze labor and labor allocation, we will consider the 
following models: 
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Workplace  allocation  =  β1   +  β2*title-dummy  +  β3*education  +  β4*age  + 
 
β5*gender 
 
 
 
Labor  market  allocation  = β1  + β2*title-dummy +  β3*education  +  β4*age + 
 
β5*gender 
 
 
 
Income allocation = β1 + β2*title-dummy + β3*education + β4*age + β5*gender 
 
 
 
Income = β1 + β2*title-dummy + β3*education + β4*age + β5*gender 
 
 
 
4.3.1. Control variables 
 
Education, measured in units of education (see appendix for methodological 
explanation). It is probable to assume that education has an effect on labor allocation 
and income, and it is therefore an important control variable. 
Age, measured in years, is a central variable since it is plausible that age affect 
under which circumstances people participate in the labor market. 
Gender is considered an essential variable to explain income and labor allocation. 
It is also an interesting variable to include in our analysis to be able to analyze how 
the title program may affect the gender groups differently. 
There is no significant covariance between the variables. In the sample I used the 
heads of household; the mother and the father. Housemothers and housefathers are 
included in the sample, as well as retired people. The result from the regressions is 
presented in the table below. 
 
 
Table 5 Labor allocation 
 
 
 Workplace allocation 
 
Labor market allocation Income Allocation 
Title dummy 0.1279* 0.0651 -0.1121* 
Education 0.0265 0.0817** -0.0816*** 
Gender -0.5139*** -0.3949*** 0,3241*** 
Age -0.0053 -0.0015 -0,000 
R2 0.2855 0,241695 0,1806 
P-value (F-statisic) 0.0000 0.0000 0,0000 
Observations 176 177 176 
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Title dummy 
Education 
Gender 
Age 
 
R2 
 
p-value (F-statisic) 
Observations 
Income 
0.2339 
 
0.0882 
 
-2.0667*** 
 
-0.0248** 
 
0.3688 
 
0.0000 
 
177 
P-values: *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01 
The table shows that all the regressions are significant with a F-statistic of 0.0000, 
which implies that at least one of the parameters of the variables are different from 
zero and can be considered to have a significant effect on the dependent variable. 
Gender is the most important control variable and is significant in all regressions. 
The result indicate that women are less likely to work outside the home, less likely to 
work in the formal sector, more likely to be self-providing or independent and earn 
significantly  less  than  men  included  in  the  sample.  The high values of the 
coefficients leave no doubt about the strong effect of gender in the sample. 
Education is a significant variable for labor market allocation, with a positive 
effect, and for income allocation, with a negative effect. The result indicates that 
higher education leads to more participation in the formal economy and it is more 
likely to be employed with a higher level of education (not self-providing). This 
result can be considered reasonable. 
Age is significant in the regression on income and has a negative effect. The result 
implies that age is negatively correlated with wage and income. This is somewhat 
surprising considering that experience is usually valued and reflected in wages. But 
considering this  particular sample with  a high  degree of independently working 
people participating in  the informal sector, it is plausible to assume that  young 
people tend to earn more since they are stronger and can simply work more. It is also 
probable that economic development in the country has benefitted the younger 
generation more than the old. The younger generation has had better access to 
education and participate more in the formal sector. 
The dummy variable indicating the possession of a title is not significant at a 5 % 
level in neither of the regressions. If we relax that condition and analyze the result 
with a p-value around 10 %, we cannot make as strong conclusions but can still 
analyze the general tendencies in the data. We can now see that the possession of a 
title  has  a  somewhat  significant  impact  on  two  dependent  variables,  workplace 
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allocation and income allocation. The conclusion we can draw from the result is in 
line with theory. The possession of a property title has a positive effect on workplace 
allocation, which implies that it is more likely to work outside the home if you 
possess a title. It also has a negative effect on income allocation, which means that 
the possession of a title is negatively correlated with being self-providing. 
In the Peruvian context, these variables are likely to be connected. Labor inside 
the house and self-providing labor are very likely to be informal. Labor opportunities 
outside the house and being employed by a company instead of being self-providing 
are activities more likely to be formal. The extension of the informal economy in 
Peru could be an explanation why title possession is not significant for participation 
in the formal economy. Even the more “formal” employments, such as working in a 
store or a factory, are likely to be outside the formal labor market since almost 60 % 
of GDP in Peru is made up by the informal economy (Schneider, et al., 2010). 
 
 
4.3.2. Effects on labor allocation depending on gender 
 
A probable explanation to the impact of the title possession is the theory of the 
effects of improved tenure security, discussed earlier. When families no longer have 
to worry about protecting the property, adults can go out looking for employment 
beyond the borders of the neighboring area, where employment with potentially 
higher wages awaits.  Since women traditionally are discriminated on the labor 
market it seemed reasonable to separate the sample for men and women. Running the 
regressions for men, this notion is confirmed. The title has no impact on any of the 
dependent variables. For women, however, the title dummy is still significant for 
workplace allocation and income allocation. This perception is better illustrated in a 
table. The table below contains data from the sample separating according to title 
possession and gender. Over 24.9 % more of the women in possession of a title work 
outside the house, than the women without a property title, while actually 6.3 % less 
of the men with a title work outside the house than the men without a property title. 
Out of the women working from home, which I have talked to, the majorities had a 
small restaurant, a small shop or made clothes to sell. These small businesses were 
independent and in most cases informal. Hence, as discussed earlier, it is plausible to 
believe that, if receiving a title makes it possible for women to obtain an employment 
outside the house, this will lead to a higher participation in the formal sector and also 
a higher wage. This chain of effects seems to concord with the observation in the 
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table. Women with a title are 20.3 % less likely to work independently and 9.3 % 
more likely to work in the formal sector. Women with a title also earn, on an 
average, 35.6 % more than women with no title. This income difference is 
substantial. 
Analyzing the same data concerning men it seems as though the theory on labor 
allocation effects only regards women. Men with a title are 6.3 % less likely to work 
at home and earn 16.7 % less than men without a property title. However, these 
numbers could have a reasonable explanation. If a man from a household where the 
woman has to stay home because of lack of a title and consequently also lack of 
tenure security, the husband has to provide for the entire family alone or with help 
from the small domestic business of his wife. He might therefore be forced to work 
very hard to earn the money needed to feed members of the family. If the wife was 
able to work and provide as well, the husband might choose to cut back on hours 
since they now are receiving two salaries. This could explain the negative salary gap 
between  titled  and  untitled  men.  Differences  in  labor  allocation  and  income 
allocation is around 3 % and therefore not that significant considering the limited 
size of the sample. 
 
 
Table 6 Labor allocation depending on gender 
 
 Workplace allocation 
(percentage working 
outside home) 
Labor allocation 
(percentage working 
in formal economy) 
Income allocation 
(percentage being self-
providing) 
 
Income 
(comparing 
average 
income) 
 
Education 
(comparing 
average 
education level) 
Women with no title 23.3% 9.3% 90.7%   
Women with title 48.1% 18.5% 70.4%   
Difference 24.9% 9.2% -20.3% 35.6% 3.9% 
Men with no title 90.0% 52.5% 47.5%   
Men with title 83.7% 55.8% 44.2%   
Difference -6.3% 3.3% -3.3% -16.7% 16.7% 
 
 
The result indicates that the title program has had a somewhat significant effect on 
the labor allocation, and that it has had different effects for men and women. Tenure 
security enables women to seek opportunities outside the home, which makes it 
possible to earn more and provide for the household. This is a positive development 
since families now can receive more income and it is also positive from a gender 
perspective. As mentioned earlier, the effect could be assumed to be greater in an 
urban context where scarcity of land is larger. 
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The result on labor allocation is somewhat consistent with Field’s result (2003), 
since she also concluded that titled households tend, to a larger degree, work outside 
the home. However, she did not control for gender differences. I did not focus on the 
effects on child labor, partly because I had very few working children in my total 
sample indicating that it is not a wide-spread phenomenon in an urban context. Based 
on the data it was not possible to distinguish if people tended to work more when 
receiving the title as Field’s result indicated. It could be stated, however, that women 
tended to earn more and that men tended to earn less, which might indicate that 
women work more and men less when possessing a title. Including the allocation of 
income variable also gave information about the tendency for women to have an 
employment when possessing a title, an effect not identified for men. The different 
result for women and men underlines the importance of including a gender aspect 
when analyzing labor allocation. 
Since I used a sample with households from neighboring areas, in contrast to 
Field’s data, I have minimized the risk of sample bias. Nonetheless, more studies 
with a larger sample are needed to compliment and confirm the results. Since not 
many studies have been done on labor mobility and allocation, the results from this 
analysis are still important.  If housing titling is part of a general formalization 
process of labor for beneficiaries and especially for women, then the social and 
economic impact of the program could be enormous. Yet, more studies have to be 
done to support the result. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
The result of the econometrical analysis accords fairly well with economic theory. 
The titles seem to have had a positive effect on various areas. The main arguments of 
Hernando de Soto, however, that the titles would lead to an improved access to 
credit, which would increase productive investments and entrepreneurship among the 
urban poor, have found little support in my study. Access to credit does not seem to 
depend on the possession of a property title. This result is in line with other empirical 
findings in other geographic settings. Although the title can be used to obtain loans, 
there are a number of other ways to access credit and both titled and untitled 
households are using credit actively in their everyday life. With a closer look at the 
loans it can be observed that more than half of the relatively large amount of loans 
were obtained during the last 2 years predating the survey. It seems as the access to 
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credit for the urban poor has improved recently. Observations done by the author, 
while gathering information in the peripheral areas of Lima, concord with this 
notion. Along the main road in Villa el Salvador, banks, credit institutes and 
other micro loan  institutions  have  field  offices  and  representatives  from  these  
organs  were walking around in the residential areas talking to families and spreading 
propaganda. It appears as though all households are affected by the improvement in 
access, not only the titled ones. 
Interestingly,  however,  the  preferences  of  the  utilization  of  the  credit  differ 
between the titled and untitled households. While titled households tend to use credit 
for household investments and education, the untitled households used it for 
productive investments and consumption. The reason for the discrepancy in the 
usage of credit might be due to tenure security. This observation confirms the 
theoretical assumption that property titles improve tenure security, which makes 
investments in housing both less risky and more profitable. Investments in education 
could be a consequence of parents letting young adults attend university and collage 
rather than to stay close to protect the property in case of expropriation. Previous 
studies have focused on the supply side rather than the demand side of the credit 
market. Hence, they have been unable to study the purpose for families to obtain 
credit and they have not been able to investigate how the families obtain credit in 
practice. One reason to the importance of focusing on demand instead of supply is 
the dysfunctional credit market with arbitral lending rules, which makes it difficult to 
do systematic observations. 
The result indicates that access to credit is not depended considerably on the 
possession of property titles. Consequently, it is hard to confirm that access to credit 
would be a mechanism by which titling programs improve the lives of urban poor. 
The result indicates, however, that titled and untitled households use the credit they 
obtain for different purposes and it might therefore be possible that an improvement 
in the access to credit affects the different households differently. If an exogenous 
shock that improves the general access to credit would take place in Peru, as I 
suggest is currently happening, it would probably have a different impact on titled 
and untitled households. As observed, the titled households would make more 
investments on housing and titled households would invest more in small businesses 
and consumption. More studies are needed to confirm this result. 
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The result from the analysis of the effects of titling on housing quality indicates a 
barely statistically significant positive relation between possession of a title and 
housing quality measured in housing material. Combining the result with the usage 
of credit allocation of titled households on housing investments makes the result 
stronger. Titled households appear more willing to invest in housing and their houses 
are generally of better quality. When it comes to access to electricity and water, the 
possession of a property title is vital, but functions more as a precondition for 
accessing municipal services than an incentive to invest. The main result of the 
effects of titling on quality of housing indicate that the title functions as a mechanism 
that improves tenure security, which in turn leads to families investing more in their 
houses. This could have a number of indirect positive effects on quality of life of the 
family, on property values, property tax revenues and the local economy. 
Improvements in quality of housing seems to be a mechanisms by which property 
titles can affect the urban poor’s life by giving them incentives to make investments 
in their houses.   However, when separating the sample in the poorest and the less 
poor households, the title loses its significance for housing quality for the poorest 
half of the population. This  suggest  that  the titling might  be affecting  different 
income  groups  differently and  that  the  “help-yourself”  approach  of  the  housing 
titling programs might be inefficient for the families living in extreme poverty. 
Additionally, the analysis suggest that people per room is not an adequate 
measurement of housing quality in the context of suburban Peru. 
The  final  focus  of  the  analysis  is  the  effects  of  the  property  titles  on  labor 
allocation and income. If we relax the condition of a 5 % level of significance on the 
p-value we can distinguish a tendency in accordance with theory. The result indicates 
that the possession of a title affects the allocation of the workplace (outside the house 
or at home) and the allocation of income (if they are self-providing or employed). It 
also results, from the analysis, that the effect of titling on labor allocation is different 
depending on gender. When separating the sample it is perceived that the title is only 
significant for the labor allocation of women. Women are the ones that stay at home 
when they do not have a title and consequently the ones that obtain a job outside the 
house when receiving a title. Outside the house, there are more well-paid formal 
working opportunities, while working from the house usually means working with 
informal small-scale self-providing businesses. Consequently, it is observed that 
income  for  titled  women  in  the  sample  is  substantially higher  than  for  untitled 
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women. Men, on the other hand, are not significantly affected by titling when it 
comes to labor allocation. Income for titled men is, on an average, lower that income 
for untitled men. This could be argued however that this is a result of titling. When 
the husband no longer is being forced to provide for the family alone, since the wife 
can obtain an income, he might choose to work less and therefore earn less. 
The result from the labor allocation analysis has important consequences, since it 
indicates that the families without a title are limited by the fear of losing their 
house. They are forced to have someone present in the house at all time. This has 
consequently limited women to domestic work, which is less profitable and creates 
dependence on one salary for the family. This implies that titling might have an 
effect on income and therefore be utterly important for the economic development of 
these families’ lives, even though this cannot be confirmed by the econometrical 
regressions. It also implies that insecure property rights limit women’s opportunities. 
Title possession also tends to lead to formalization of labor, which has positive 
effects on the entire economy. The result suggests that labor allocation is one of the 
channels by which the property title can improve the lives of urban poor. 
This study shows that the titles have had a positive economic effect on the lives of 
the urban poor. The study focused on three different mechanisms by which theory 
suggested that property titles had its economic effects; access to credit, quality of 
housing and allocation of labor. Even though improved access to credit theoretically 
has been the primary objective of titling programs, this study shows no strong results 
indicating that effect. However, as concluded above, the titles have had an impact on 
the physical living conditions and economical situations of the families by the other 
two mechanisms; quality of housing and allocation of labor. Both of these affects are 
believed to be effects of improved tenure security. The result therefore indicates that 
the property titles do increase the households’ perceived notion of security and 
consequently their quality of life. It could be argued that this effect of titling is 
stronger in an urban context where scarcity of land exists to a larger extent than in 
rural settings, where most titling programs have been executed. The rather important 
result of this study is in need of more extensive testing with larger samples to be 
confirmed. 
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Interviews 
 
On, 25-01-2012 Chavin de Huantar, Villa el Salvador, Lima, Peru 
 
Soto Mendoza, 05-01-2012, Municipalidad de Villa el Salvador, Lima, Peru 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
Sample properties 
The table below contains general information about the families that participated in 
the survey. 
 
 
 
100 families 
 
 
Neighborhood Tacalá Sector 7 Sector 9 
 
Chavín de 
Huantar 
 
Encantadora 
de Villa Other 
 
Nr of families 17 26 18 32 3 4 
 
% of invasions  1 0,81 0,65 0,97 1 1 
% of titleholders  0,94 0,885 0,83   87,5%* 0,66 0,75 
average year received  2006 1995 1997   2011* 2005 1987 
Average time spent in house  11 19 14 13 15 19 
Average size of household  5,4 7 5,8 4,9 6 5 
Average number of rooms  2,9 4 3,2 2,7 2,7 4,3 
Average age of parents 
Average number of children 
living at home 
 45,5 49 44 41 48 49 
 
 
2,4 2,8 2,7 2,5 3 2,3 
Average age of children 
Average household 
 19 19 20 15 9 20 
income** 1800-2400 1800-2400 1200-1800 1200-1800 601-1200 1801-2400 
Average amount of 
loans*** 
  
0,53 
 
0,65 
 
0,5 
 
0,72 
 
0,67 
 
0,75 
Water  0 0,92 0,94 0,03 1 0,75 
Electricity  0,94 0,96 1 0,03 1 0,75 
House of noble material  0,06 0,69 0,72 0,03 0,67 0,25 
 
*In the study, the households in Chavin de Huantar that were titled in june-july 2011, were considered untitled households since they 
received their titles just months before the carrying out of the survey. 
** In Nuevos Soles 
*** Average amount of families in each neighborhood that have used credit. 
 
 
Measuring access to credit 
 
To measure access to credit I developed a measurement with a scale from 1-10, 
based on indicators such as willingness to access credit, previous experience with 
credit, origin of credit and amount of obtained credit etc. Cost of credit could not be 
included because of insufficient information about costs of received loans obtained in 
the survey. The measurement is trying to grasp the difference between the need and 
desire to access credit and the actual ability to obtain credit. The measurement is 
based on my own perception about constraints, for example, I believe that someone 
who have chosen not to obtain loans because they feel that they could not return the 
Alvina Erman, 880412-7002 Supervisor: Pontus Hansson 
44 
 
 
 
 
money is more constrained then someone who chooses not to take credit because 
they do not trust the banks. The latter is limited because of ideas and the former 
believe they do not have the means to do so. This method can seem arbitrary and 
subjective, but in practice I believe that the measurement is effective and it has not 
been hard to systematically categorizing the data. The categories used are the 
following: 
1.    Want to obtain loan. Have considered applying or have applied for loan at 
commercial bank. Application has been denied or the individual is convinced that the 
application would get denied. 
2.    Want  to  obtain  loan.  Have  considered  obtaining  credit  from  commercial 
bank. Believe that the family would not be able to return the money 
3.    Want  to  obtain  loan.  Have  considered  obtaining  credit  from  commercial 
bank. Believe that the family would not be able to pay the costs of the bank. Feel that 
it is too expensive 
4.    Have considered obtaining credit. Do not like the conditions to obtain credit. 
Do not want to use title as collateral 
5.    Have considered obtaining credit. Have not applied because of distrust in 
banks and against the principal of credit. 
6.    Have obtained credit. Problems with returning the loan because of default. 
Problems with obtaining new loans or chosen not to do it because of previous 
experiences. 
7. Have obtained loans 
 
8. Have obtained more than one loan from the same source 
 
9.    Have obtained more than 2 loans from the same bank or more than 1 loan 
from different sources. 
10.  Have obtained more than 3 loans of more than S/.1000 (about 2500 SEK). Or 
“repeated loans”; every year or every second year. 
 
 
Only families that have considered obtaining a loan (either formal or informal) 
have been coded and they have all received two numbers. The first number represent 
the family’s access to formal credit (commercial or public banks, credit institutes, 
micro-loans etc.) and the second represent the access to all credit (the formal credit 
plus credit from informal institutes, banquitos, relatives and “third person” etc.). For 
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informal credit I used the same measurement (7-10) depending on the amounts and 
occasions they have obtained informal credit. 
 
 
Measuring education 
 
Education has been measured on a scale from 1 to 7, according to the following 
scheme: 
- 1: Unfinished primary school 
 
- 2: Finished primary school 
 
- 3: Unfinished secondary school 
 
- 4: Finished secondary school 
 
- 5: Technical studies 
 
- 6: Collage, higher institutes 
 
- 7: University studies 
